How to Defend Australia author Professor Hugh White must be feeling vindicated. Prime Minister, Scott Morrison has announced a major boost in defence spending warning the post COVID-19 world would be “poorer, more dangerous and more disorderly”. He said:
“We have moved into a new and less benign strategic area, one in which the institutions and patterns of cooperation that have benefited our prosperity and security for decades are now under increasing, and I would suggest, almost-irreversible strain,” and went on to say “We have not seen the conflation of global economic and strategic uncertainty now being experienced here in Australia, in our region, since the existential threat we faced when the global and regional order collapsed in the 1930s and 1940s,”. While comparisons with the 1930’s and 1940’s might be an exaggeration,there can be no doubt we will be entering a different world on the other side of the pandemic which will more uncertain.
In keeping with Professor White’s recommendations the first item on the new defence agenda will be airborne and land based anti-ship missiles. Given that these can be procured and deployed at comparatively low cost and relatively quickly, this is eminently sensible. Other items such as submarines and the trouble plagued F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will take longer.
While all this will be costly, the virtual cessation of immigration on account of the COVID-19 pandemic will save tens of billions of dollars on infrastructure this financial year and will save even more if the borders remain closed, which they may well do until as late as early 2022, when we will be less than five months out from the next Federal Election. (My research tells me that the latest possible date for a simultaneous half-Senate and House of Representatives election is 21st May 2022 and it could well be held earlier than this.)
On an encouraging note, there are clear indications of support from the Labor Opposition for the Morrison Government’s change of direction on defence. With America bought to its knees by the COVID-19 pandemic, it seems to have finally dawned on both sides of politics that we cannot rely on the U.S. for our security; we have to be materially prepared to look after ourselves.
Category: Defence
How to Defend Australia
This is the title of a provocative new book by Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, Hugh White, who was an advisor to former Defence Minister, Kim Beazley and former Prime Minister the late Bob Hawke.
Professor White says that we can no longer rely on the US security umbrella in an era of growing assertiveness by Beijing, and need to develop the capability to defend ourselves without outside help. He was dismissed as an alarmist when he first foreshadowed in 2010 the demise of American influence in Asia. But the Lowy Institute’s international security program director Sam Roggeveen said he had since been proved correct.
Professor White urges increasing defence spending from 2 percent to 3.5 percent of GDP He described America under President Trump, as looking “weak and unreliable, despite the tough talk”.
Something that is not widely understood about Trump is, his rhetoric not withstanding he is the most isolationist President the United States has had, this side of World War II. One would have to go back to the 1920’s to find a President as isolationist; in chronological order, Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, take your pick. He takes the view that America should concentrate on dealing with domestic ills and given that America is a country with much that needs putting right, this is valid even laudable, though as Trump is finding out, disengagement is easier said than done.
But the bottom line is, that ANZUS is no longer (if it ever was) a guarantee of American military assistance in the event of things going south.
White’s preferred ADF force structure is built around the ability to sink ships, since “only ships can carry the vast amounts of material required for a major land campaign”. White says that such an invasion remains unlikely, (though perhaps not as unlikely as he thinks) yet a substantial part of the ADF he proposes to build would be designed to sink the fleet transporting an invasion force. To this end he proposes the ADF be restructured which can be summarised as follows,
- Royal Australian Navy: A major cutback on surface vessels and procurement of more submarines. In fact he is calling for a doubling of the submarine fleet.
- Royal Australian Air Force: Aim for 200 combat aircraft over the 72 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters currently on order.
- Australian Army: What he describes as ‘larger but lighter’.
Another ingredient he proposes is land based anti ship missiles.
Most controversially he suggests Australia should consider a debate about acquiring nuclear weapons. Professor White told the Sydney Morning Herald that while he is not endorsing the nuclear option, which “scares” him, “it’s a debate we have to have.” He has made it clear he does not advocate that we must acquire nuclear weapons.
Even at this early date he has encountered considerable disagreement on nuclear weapons, most notably from former Australian army chief, Peter Leahy, now head of Canberra University’s National Security Institute, who says the idea that Australia should consider arming itself with defensive nuclear weapons is “too risky.”. In his words:
“Any more countries adopting a nuclear deterrent “creates more risk: risk of suspicion, risk of first use, risk of the weapons being seized or falling under the control of non-state actors.”
The huge expense involved was also a concern, as was the fact that “terrorists are currently studying how to build nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. We don’t need more [nuclear arms in the world], we don’t need the vulnerabilities that come with that.”
In any case Australian opinion, both official and popular is firmly set against nuclear weapons as an option, as evidenced by Defence minister Senator Linda Reynolds and Labor’s shadow defence minister Richard Marles rejecting consideration of nuclear weapons capability, citing Australia’s longstanding support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. For my part I am not terribly keen on nuclear weapons, and am inclined to agree with Leahy’s view that the risks involved, to say nothing of the massive costs involved in acquiring such a capability, would outweigh any defence benefits to Australia.
Having said that, otherwise in broad principle I entirely agree with what Professor White is saying. He is saying to a larger audience than I have, what I said when I started this. I will go over his proposals and dissect them.
To start off with, I fully endorse the commonsense strategy of taking full advantage of Australia’s natural defences by investing in more submarines. But I have serious reservations about wholesale cutting back, on surface ships. Surface ships which can respond to humanitarian crises which submarines cannot do, are critical. A probably politically acceptable compromise, would be to keep existing surface ships, but cancel the nine frigates currently on order and put the savings toward submarines.
When it comes to increasing the number of combat aircraft from 70 to 200, the good Professor will get no argument from me here. Air superiority, at absolute minimum air parity would be vital to successfully repelling any invasion attempt. Australia already has 72 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters on order and as this is written has taken delivery of the first few. After the last of the 72 F-35’s have been delivered, rather than make up the next 130 with those overpriced and to put it charitably overrated machines, a good alternative to consider would be the Saab JAS 39 Gripen. This is an excellent low cost fourth-generation fighter, costing only slightly over half of the F-35’s initial cost was going to be. Several squadrons of them teamed with mobile batteries of land based anti ship missiles would (hopefully) make any would be invader think twice. It’s true the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy do not use the Gripen, but if the ANZUS treaty eventually becomes a dead letter, then the issue of interoperability with the U.S. military would be irrelevant.
His most contentious proposal (from my angle) concerns the Australian Army which would become a light force for stabilisation operations in Papua New Guinea and the broader South Pacific. This would mean a larger but more lightly equipped army. Tanks would be dispensed with, in favour of more lightly armoured trucks like the Bushmaster, wheeled armoured personnel carriers like the ASLAV, and helicopters. A larger army yes, but dispensing with heavy capability I cannot agree with. It would leave us without an effective Plan B, should an invading force manage to establish a bridgehead on the Australian mainland, in spite of the best efforts of the Navy and RAAF. It is best at shortsighted and at worst foolhardy. This is the only real flaw in Professor White’s thesis and in no way invalidates his sound advocacy of fully exploiting our geographical advantages to advantage in our defence strategy.
All this will entail substantially upsizing the ADF, probably to the point where for the first time in peacetime, the number of active duty personnel will exceed 100 000. As to where the manpower will come from, Professor White does not say a great deal. He does briefly mention National Service/conscription, but comes over as not in favour of it as ‘a way to deliver efficient military capabilities’. To his great credit he also devotes a couple of paragraphs, in fact several, to the very important issue of fuel security which I commented on in my last post.
And finally there is the overriding question, where’s the money coming from? Would increasing defence spending from 2 percent to 3.5 percent of GDP mean cutting spending in other areas; would more money for guns mean less for welfare, education, health? Well it could be that way, but it doesn’t have to be.
There is a huge source of funds that could be obtained by cutting immigration significantly, which would free billions of dollars that would otherwise be spent on infrastructure. The last financial years cap of 160 000 would have cost $32 billion in infrastructure costs and that’s a conservative estimate. Cutting the general stream to its historical average of 70 000 a year plus up to another 30 000 for refugee and humanitarian, would make for an intake of 90 000 to 100 000 a year-about what we had under Malcolm Fraser. Even at the higher figure (100 000) this would save at least $12 billion on current numbers and again that’s estimating conservatively. In any case with over 100 000 Australians homeless, hundreds of thousands more having to choose between eating or heating and generally struggling to make ends meet, 150 000 plus a year immigration is an additional stress factor we can do without.
On the question of value for money Professor White makes some interesting comparisons starting with Singapore which spends less than half as much on defence as we do. It has 100 frontline fighters, six small major warships, 17 corvettes and patrol boats, five “old but quite capable submarines” and four mid sized amphibious ships. On land it has three combat ready heavy divisions with well over 4000 fighting vehicles. Admittedly Singapore’s tiny size means it does not incur the operating costs we do, over a large continent.
Moving on to Israel it has 300 fourth generation fighters. Its navy is basically a glorified coastguard so far as surface vessels go, but operates six submarines. The army has 133 000 active duty personnel and 380 000 reservists.There are six active and thirteen reserve infantry brigades and four active and eight reserve armoured brigades with 2760 main battle tanks, over 6000 armoured personnel carriers and 600 self propelled 155 mm howitzers, making for an army ten times the size of ours. Including its nuclear forces this is on A$26 billion a year, approximately three quarters of what we spend on defence.
Of course it has to be remembered that both Singapore and Israel have universal conscription which we don’t, but even taking that into account they seem to be getting a lot more bang for their buck.
And lastly France which spends only 40 per cent more that we do, but has almost 250 fighters, an aircraft carrier, three amphibious assault ships, ten nuclear powered submarines, 23 major surface warships and an active duty army of 117 000 with some 3600 armoured fighting vehicles-and a nuclear capability.
Without going into detail the good Professor makes it clear, that for Australia to get comparable value for money will require a vigorous and ongoing anti inefficiency drive.
While I have some differences with Professor White, nonetheless a book like How to Defend Australia is long overdue. We need to have a serious conversation about what we want in terms of defence and national security. Hopefully How to Defend Australia will bring this about.
The Tyranny of BMI: ADF Fitness Standards
Attempting to enlist for a Reservist about eighteen months ago the writer ran foul of the Body Mass Index or BMI. The BMI is defined as the body mass divided by the square of the body height. While it is some sort of yardstick, its weakness is, that it is not diagnostic of the body fatness or health of an individual. It does not provide an accurate measure of fat versus muscle mass. The end result is that many potentially suitable recruits get rejected.
The arbitrariness of BMI as an absolute yardstick was bought home to me at the local show, sometime prior to writing this when I watched the competition wood chopping. The competitors I saw would be considered by most standards extremely fit and strong, probably Special Forces direct entry standard fit or not far off it, yet at least one or two of them would fail the BMI test.
It would make no sense however, to go criticizing current ADF practise without suggesting a workable alternative approach. The following is taken from the Arrowhead Regional (Minnesota) Militia handbook. It would be based on US Military standards which are not that different from ours.
Level 1, 2 & 3 gear:
Level one is what you carry on you; in your BDU (Battle Dress Uniform) pockets or belt (compass, matches, knife, etc. Pistol (if in a drop leg holster)
Level two is the above plus your rifle, web gear/vest, mag pouches, etc.
Level three is all the above plus your full pack w/sleeping bag (aka, “72 hour gear”)
Fitness levels
1XX – Minimum physical fitness level – 2 mile (3.2 km) Field march w/Level 1 gear in 40 minutes.
2XX – Moderate physical fitness level – 3 miles (4.8 km) field march w/Level 2 gear in 65 minutes.
3XX – Excellent physical fitness level – 5 mile (8 km) field march w/Level 3 (72 hour) gear in 2 hours.
I would rate my fitness by those standards as somewhere between Moderate and Excellent. I could probably get up to Excellent with only a modest amount of remedial training.
For the sake of comparison there are the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) profile numbers based on a score out of a scale of 100
Combatant
97: (Minimum score of 97) Perfectly healthy and fit for field combat units, in the elite units in the corps as well as in the combat battalions. In cases of very mild problems (such as the need for glasses), a note is added that does not lower the profile, but dismisses the soldier from volunteering to be a part of the elite units. Since 2005, soldiers can be accepted for the flight training course with glasses (up to 1 diopter).
82: (Minimum score of 82) A slight problem (for example: color blindness). Unfit for elite combat units but fit for infantry and the combat battalions.
77: A special profile for people who suffer from allergic rhinitis and excessive perspiration. Fit to serve in roles that require a 04 level of combat training (for example, certain positions in the engineering corps)
72: A moderate problem (knee or back problems, mild asthma, allergies or a high level of myopia (above 7 diopters). Unfit for infantry service, but eligible for several combat units like the Armored Corps, Artillery, Air Defense, specific roles in the Field Intelligence Corps and the Caracal Battalion.
65: A problem or injury caused during the military service.
Non-combatant
64: A serious problem (asthma, low BMI, attention deficit disorder, high blood pressure). Unfit for combat.
45: A very serious problem (severe asthma, severe orthopedic problems, severe mental status). Unfit for combat service and many military courses.
35: A special profile for people with diabetes, the hearing impaired and people with epilepsy. Able to serve in various roles with certain limitations due to their medical condition.
30: Volunteers who received a profile of 21 and nonetheless asked to serve.
24: Temporarily unfit for service (severe sensitivity to bee stings, temporary low BMI, anemia). The soldier gets a temporary exemption and gets monitored every few months with the possibility of raising his profile.
21: Totally unfit for military service for health reasons (physical or mental). With this profile a soldier can still volunteer for military service by getting a profile of 30.
Profile 30 soldiers would, it goes without saying, be limited to non combatant roles. Those scoring less than 21 would be considered ‘abjectly unsuitable’ for military service in any way, shape or form.
The reason for the IDF profile system is ultimately grounded in Israel’s difficult geopolitical circumstances, namely a small country with limited resources and surrounded by potentially hostile neighbors and lacking significant natural defenses. By drafting Profile 64’s or lower into technical support or administrative roles, this frees up the maximum number of men for combat units. Even so this is not enough to furnish adequate manpower for service and administrative personnel and consequently this is a major reason why women are also subject to the draft
In the unlikely event Australia were to reintroduce peacetime National Service given that it would no longer be legally possible to have Vietnam era style selective service, and that as well as being universal it would like Israel, have to include women, it is likely that something like the IDF profile system would be adopted. But I digress.
Another group of people who demonstrate the shortcomings of BMI as a yardstick are shearers. Shearers are among the few people outside the world of high end athletics who can appreciate the sheer physical effort involved in Olympic level training, research having shown that shearing is as physically strenuous as training for Olympic track and field and other events. Many shearers like the woodcutters mentioned earlier, would be Special Forces direct entry fit or close to it. There are though, shearers who would fail the BMI test, albeit not that many.
In the final analysis what a person is physically capable of in the real world, should be what matters rather than a number.
You Be The Judge
A couple of weeks ago I came across a United Australia Party election video alleging Chinese Communist government controlled companies are exercising control of airports and ports in Western Australia contrary to the security of all Australians. You can watch the original video here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQB9uPIBfHY
While Clive Palmer’s Sinophobia is old news, in fairness to the man, he has had past dealings with the Chinese which have left an impression, not it seems a good one. What is more, many of his concerns would seem to have been vindicated with the publication of Professor Clive Hamilton’s book Silent Invasion which I covered in my post of January 11th.
All I can suggest is, take a look at the original video and judge for yourself.
Territorial Defence As Part of Australia’s Defence Mix: Part II
Following on from my last post I will be elaborating on the role of the ‘Second Reserve Force’. In the paper I posted on August 12th I called it the Auxiliary Reserve for want of a better name at the time, but it has subsequently occurred to me that a couple of good alternatives might be ‘Territorial Reserve’ or ‘Territorial Auxiliary Reserve’. Some readers might prefer ‘National Guard’ or similar, but I doubt that would fly in official circles.
To recap it would be organised differently at company level. Instead of the standard 3×3 organisation (three platoons of three 8-man sections) there would be a maximum of eight 9-man (in the initial two phases) basic units per company. With basic units widely spread out, cutting out the platoon echelon in peacetime would simplify the problem of the ‘two A’s’, administration and accountability. At the same time it would structured so to be able to be easily reshuffled into a standard 3×3 rifle company should the need arise.
Such a force would would be a multi role one, well suited for irregular operations, but able to be deployed in a more conventional role. I have been asked “How would you justify its existence”. By and large that’s something I’d leave to the spin doctors, but a good spiel I can think of goes something like, “To provide an extra layer of defence capability, against threats to Australia’s security, foreign and domestic“.
To date State and Federal police and security services have done an admirably competent job of scotching jihadi terror plots in the coastal metropolitan areas. It says something that there have been no mass casualty attacks so far.
The hinterland is a different matter. There have been no jihadi attacks in the hinterland since the Battle of Broken Hill on New Years Day 1915, but it would be extremely unwise to count on our luck holding up here. Many communities in the hinterland are potentially highly vulnerable as ‘soft targets’. They have only a light to modest police and no military presence; certainly no regular army and and even reservists none too thick on the ground.
In the event of an attack in such a community the police would be hard put to cope to say the least. With a higher than average rate of gun ownership such communities are not entirely defenceless, but this does make it more more likely that any possible attacks would likely be by a group; a lone wolf jihadi would be sent to Paradise in short order. Against a group with some level of tactical training a decently armed, but unstructured or loosely organised and untrained civilian posse could have a hard time of it.
Aside from “threats to Australia’s security, foreign and domestic”, a force of this kind could have other uses. Had one been in existence in 1996 it could have made a difference at Port Arthur. A whole nine, ten or eleven man unit would not have been necessary; a hastily assembled four or five man fire team sized detachment could have bought Martin Bryant’s rampage to an early end and saved many lives.
To get down to the nuts and bolts of getting a basic unit up and running recruiting a full sized nine man unit first up would not be the best way to go. Considering that at least three quarters of the new recruits would have no prior military experience or training it would be better to start small, four or five men, six at the absolute maximum, fire team size. An arbitrary definition of a fire team or corresponding unit could be no more men than than a single leader can control under all conditions including restrictive terrain or conditions of poor visibility or darkness.
Experience and experimental field exercises have demonstrated that a leader to led ratio of 1:5 is the maximum here, which makes for a maximum of six men all up. Set down below is the scheme for a basic 3-4 to 6-man start up unit.
1. TEAM LEADER. This is the person responsible for setting up and developing the unit. He would have prior military experience or training and set up training for the team, establish and maintain unit cohesiveness. This is the person whom the team feels that they are most likely to rally around. He directs team fire and maneuver during combat. The team leader should lead by example. He maintains contact with higher elements in the unit.
2. COMMUNICATIONS MAN. This is the units radio operator. This person understands some basic radio operating procedures, and aids the team leader in keeping in contact with other units.
3. MEDIC. The person in the unit with the highest level of medical training will be the unit medic. It is hoped that the unit medic has at least St John Australia, Advanced First Aid training. The more training, the better. Your medic will check on the overall field health and sanitation conditions of the team. Medics are also responsible for checking each person’s first aid gear. Team medics should carry additional medical gear, over and above that required for individuals. They are also responsible for aiding the team leader in checking individuals’ water supplies.
This is a good basic three-man fire team type unit.
Additionally, we may round out the ‘fire team’ by adding 1-3 riflemen to the unit. Everybody is a rifleman. Riflemen are responsible for maintaining a high level of combat readiness. A rifleman assists the team leader and other members in maintaining the unit. He or she may also serve as a communications man or medic. Riflemen are the backbone of all armed ground forces in the world.
A few more specific rifleman positions that may be included in the unit are:
4. LIGHT MACHINE GUNNER. This is the person who has charge of the unit’s light machine gun. It is also the person who is capable of carrying a lot of ammunition. Light machine gunners are used for suppressive fire, and covering likely avenues of approach. The light machine gunner gunner, will be unit four.
5. Designated Marksman. Well placed, accurate shots are the job of your team designated marksman. He or she should be capable of placing first round hits on a dinner plate sized target at whatever range is considered practical and applicable. A good rifle with good optics are best for this position, but any rifleman should be considered a potential designated marksman. The designated marksman may be someone in the unit who is a sporting shooter i.e. a hunter or target shooter. Perhaps the designated marksman can help with rifle instruction and training. If there is a team designated marksman, he is unit five.
6. Rifleman-Grenadier. If there is a sixth man he can be assigned as grenadier with an M203 grenade launcher attached to his rifle. In a smaller unit while the team leader cannot be a light machine gunner or designated marksman, he can double as grenadier. If there is a designated grenadier who is not team leader, he is unit six.
A unit could start with the basic three (team leader, medic and communications man) plus one rifleman, could start training and be increased to six, a single recruit at a time, but this is not set in stone. Depending on the recruits it could be possible to start with five and then increase to six or even start with six and either way once the six man unit is at a reasonably proficient level it could expanded above six, if possible to the full nine in one go, subdivided into three 3-man teams, each team consisting of two ‘veterans’ plus one recruit.
Starting small with six or fewer would make for easy one on one or very small group instruction in such essential basics as hand and arm signals, map reading and land navigation, radio communications and first aid.
Getting the five to six man startup unit to a reasonable standard of proficiency is important, in case something on the order of Tomorrow When the War Began were to happen, before phase two,of expanding basic units to their full nine man strength could be initiated. Were this to happen then they would be able to go straight into action and start engaging and harassing the enemy.
The foundation of any small unit is the unity of purpose which enables the team to work as a coordinated unit. Team Leader is a position, not a person. Should the Team Leader be lost, the next member becomes Team Leader and the mission continues. It is therefore, very important that the ‘fire team’ trains as a unit. They must develop as a unified whole, each man knowing the strengths and weaknesses–each acting as support and backup for the other. This is often called the “two-deep concept.”
It would be self evident to anyone reading the above, that the style of unit described would be manifestly defensive and unsuitable for offshore deployment and would be unlikely to use the colloquial, spook the neighbours. The word to foreign affairs and defence ministries in Manila and Jakarta would be something on the order of “I don’t think there’s anything to worry about here. I very much doubt the Australians have any aggressive intentions with this Auxiliary Reserve/Territorial Reserve/Territorial Auxiliary Reserve. It’s little more than a glorified Home Guard.”
The ace up the sleeve that a second reserve force would provide, could make a crucial difference when it could be really needed.
Territorial Defence As Part of Australia’s Defence Mix
This post has been a long time in writing, but considering what it deals with this is hardly surprising.
Having worked through the Australian Army’s land warfare doctrine I will say that it didn’t tell me a great deal I don’t already know. But on the credit side it doesn’t strike me as being set in stone rigid. It comes over as fluid enough to be adjustable to changing circumstances, which is as well. ‘Doctrine’ has been known to fail miserably in the real world.
A classic example which is almost recent enough to be within living memory is the Imperial Japanese Army. (IJA)
The IJA’s doctrine was very infantry based. It was a conventional, infantry-oriented force, indoctrinated with the spirit of the offensive and led at all echelons by aggressive commanders who relied on Japan’s intangible qualities to overcome the material superiority of their foes.
Though not specially trained for jungle or island warfare, its infantry tactics that employed mobility, night movement, infiltration, flanking attacks, and hand-to-hand fighting proved readily adaptable to jungle warfare. But an army structured for fast moving, large-unit operations was ill-suited for the island campaigns of the Pacific in which terrain fragmented large units and restricted maneuver. Doctrine also mandated resistance to the bitter end, stressed that captured territory could not be abandoned in the face of the enemy, and prohibited surrender.
The suicidal banzai charges on Saipan in July 1944 illustrated this doctrine and its tenacious grip on Japanese tacticians. Only in mid-August 1944 did the high command issue a provisional tactical manual on island defense that called for hardened positions and a protracted defense. These were not static fortifications but strongpoints organized for a mobile defense executed with élan and fighting spirit. By that time, however, it was too late to change the embedded thinking of many Japanese officers who were determined to attack no matter what the circumstances. Despite setback after setback, IJA commanders were reluctant to alter current doctrine. Officers at all echelons balked at shifting to purely defensive tactics. As George Smith Patton pithily expressed it ‘the object is not to die for your country, but to make the other poor dumb bastard die for his’ and the Japanese played to this like a dream. Tactical retreat, even feigned retreat as a tactical ploy was anathema to the Japanese mindset.
Besides doctrinal shortcomings, the IJA’s culture hampered its performance. Line officers and operations staff officers were contemptuous of intelligence, which handicapped planning and operational effectiveness. At high command level weak intelligence led the Japanese to embark on a venture for which they were ill-prepared, and misperceptions of their enemies played an important part in preventing them from properly reforming their methods.
The IJA’s success in the Centrifugal Offensive in 1941-42 was attributable as much or more to the shortcomings of its adversaries, as its own strengths. This was particularly the case in Malaya where the British forces outnumbered the Japanese over 2:1 and has caused many to speculate as to whether Malaya could have been held, given a few more resources and more able leadership on the British side. Such speculations however, are beyond the scope of this post. But once the Allies had recovered their equilibrium and started to push back, then the IJA’s weaknesses particularly when pitted against Allied material superiority stared to become more and more apparent. Allied commanders were willing to undertake a meticulous effort to learn the strengths and weaknesses of the IJA’s combat methods and analyze the lessons they learned from combat experiences, and at the same time identify any mistakes that were made. Their Japanese counterparts did no such thing.
The moral of all this is, that a stagnant military culture, which discourages moves to address any deficiencies that affect its performance, and this combined with a rigidly inflexible doctrine and a flawed one at that, is a road that in the end leads to nothing but total defeat.
The example of the IJA is admittedly an example at the extreme end of the spectrum, but it demonstrates what comes of exalting doctrine into dogma without regard for on the ground reality.
The Australian Army’s land warfare doctrine by comparison could well be elastic enough to accommodate Territorial Defence as part of Australia’s overall defence strategy.
A pure Territorial Defence posture has been characterised in the following terms:
1. A manifestly defensive system, unsuited to attack across the country’s borders . . . and unlikely to be perceived as a threat by other states’
2. A military system relying principally on latent rather than standing forces, involving a broad spectrum of citizens . . . and usually projecting a comprehensive or “total” response of the people to war.
3. A military system that relies on weapons and technologies different in
type and composition from those of outward-reaching intervention and bombardment systems.
4. A system that relates the military resources of a society so closely to the defence of its own territory and institutions.
Of course it is not likely that Australia would adopt a pure Territorial Defence posture any time soon, if at all. But if current doctrine is indeed elastic enough to be able to incorporate it as a component of overall defence strategy then it ought to be considered.
For the forseeable future Australia does need to maintain an adequate offshore deployment capability to protect its interests in the regional neighbourhood and further afield if needs be. But as to dealing with a direct threat to the Australian mainland there is a serious question mark as to whether the Army and the ADF as a whole would be up to coping with a direct attack of the kind described in my post of September 11th without outside assistance. This is where the “Second Reserve Force” as described in the August 12th post could make a difference and very likely a crucial difference. As it has taken long enough to write this, I will go into the details later on.
Estonia: A Different Way of Doing Defence
In this post I am going to contrast the difference between Australia and the Baltic nation of Estonia in the way they do defence.
Formerly part of the Tsarist Russian empire, the Republic of Estonia gained its independence in 1918, interrupted by the half a century long Soviet occupation following World War II. Estonia regained its independence in 1991.
With a population of only 1.3 million there is no way it could field large enough standing forces to defend itself, even with conscription. (Which it has) Also while not the poorest country in Europe it is not the wealthiest either. Consciously or not Estonia has to a large extent, copied the Swiss model of a militia based army.
The Estonian Army has at this writing 6,425 full time personnel, approximately half of whom are conscripts plus approximately 21,000 reservists. The Navy by contrast is little more than a glorified coastguard and the Estonian Air Force with 300 personnel and a single figure number of operational aircraft is for practical purposes, all but nonexistent.
Of more interest is the paramilitary Estonian Defence League over 15,000 strong at this writing. Though not part of the Estonian Army proper, it still comes under the Ministry of Defence. They are organised in 15 malevs ranging from a battalion up to a brigade in size, corresponding for the most part to the country’s 15 counties. A fairly back to basics light infantry force, a large part of its equipment consists of hand-me-downs sourced from other countries. Its major role in the event of invasion would be as a stay-behind force.
A common assumption is that, being largely flat and too small to offer defense in depth, Estonia and the other Baltic States offer good prospects for mechanized forces to advance rapidly. However, this is a generalisation that overlooks the fact that these states do have geographical features that can be exploited by well-prepared irregular fighters. The region has 7,000 lakes, numerous peat bogs, marshes, swamps and a multitude of rivers. Densely wooded areas, lakes, streams and marshlands would often make the off-road movement of mechanized units difficult, sometimes even impossible. As the name suggests, the “Forest Brothers” guerrillas after World War II exploited the dense Baltic forest to good effect and gave the Soviet occupation forces some serious pain.
The unpalatable reality for any would be invader is, there is simply no known way to preemptively neutralise well-prepared and equipped stay-behind units. Enemy intelligence would have the unenviable task of trying to identify unit leaders, commissioned and non commissioned pre invasion and keeping in mind that all leaders are expected to command units one level above their own, their troubles would not be over. Occupation forces would have an extremely limited window of opportunity, more often than not none at all, to kill, or capture and disarm Defence League units, before they could get active. In effect existing counterinsurgency warfare manuals would have to be shredded and then rewritten on the fly.
There are probably a few things we could learn, but while Australia and Estonia are at least broadly culturally similar, in the sense of being white European nations, there are very substantial differences in terms of history, geography, demographics and geopolitical circumstances. In any case the setting up of a paramilitary militia force separate from the Australian Army proper, but still under the Department of Defence would require changing the law, which would of course need an Act of Parliament. But while I am no lawyer and am not across the Defence Act, I am reasonably sure that something coming within the framework of the Army could very likely be done within the letter of the Act as it currently stands, without needing to involve Parliament at all.
The bottom line is though, that if Australian considers territorial defence as a part of its defence strategy, Estonia is one of several countries it ought to study, as part of a process of arriving at a model to suit our needs and circumstances.
The Infantry Battalion 2018: A Case of Institutional Amnesia?
For some time now I have been wading through the Australian Army’s land warfare doctrine and while I have yet to pass judgment on it as a whole, LWD 3-3-7 Employment Of Infantry has left me with some serious misgivings, regarding changes to the organisation of the infantry battalion.
The basic rifle company still maintains its triangular structure, three platoons each consisting of three eight man sections, broken down into two fire team half sections plus a command element consisting of a lieutenant, a platoon sergeant as 2ic, a radio operator and a medic. In mechanised battalions, each section has an organic APC, which is crewed by an additional two soldiers. In light infantry battalions each rifle company platoon is now augmented by a fourth manoeuvre support section which contains three four-man teams. Each team has a leader, a grenadier, a marksman with a specialised rifle, and either an MAG 58 machine gun or an 84 mm medium DFSW. The mechanised infantry platoon does not have this fourth manoeuvre support section.
There is nothing new about adding fire support at platoon level. In World War I when the Lewis gun was introduced dedicated Lewis gun sections were formed in each platoon, as the weapon though lighter and much more mobile than the Vickers machine gun, was still too heavy and unwieldy for employment at rifle section level. Likewise starting from World War II, the United States Army and also the United States Marine Corps have employed organic machine gun squads in their rifle platoons. But the new manoeuvre support section is as far as I am aware (I could well be mistaken), like nothing found in any other army. It looks alright on paper but has yet to be really seriously tested. What is of much greater concern to me though is the change to the Table of Organisation reducing the infantry battalion from four rifle companies to three.
To make one thing clear first up, there is no debate at all about the triangular structure at company and platoon level. It has been tried and tested from World War I onwards. The First AIF went to war in 1914 with an infantry battalion of four companies, each of four platoons of four ten man sections. The horrendous casualties on the Western Front combined with recruiting shortfalls forced reshuffling down to three platoons per company, and eventually this attrition forced change proved superior to its predecessor and was adopted on a permanent basis after the war.
A triangular battalion is a different matter altogether. The shortcomings of the triangular battalion that the United States Army had employed to good effect in World War II and Korea were glaringly shown up in Vietnam.
Operations in Vietnam were a mixture of conventional and unconventional warfare and jungle and urban combat. Furthermore, due to the nature of operations in Vietnam the battalions were forced to perform a number of operations simultaneously. These included searching, blocking, reserve/reaction and security forces. The effectiveness of these operations depended on fielding the maximum number of riflemen. But several factors undermined the ability of the battalions to achieve sufficient “paddy strength.” Due to the environment and to the nature of operations casualties were very high. Security requirements for battalion, brigade and fire support bases also served to drain rifle strength. As a result companies organised with 180 soldiers often operated with only 65 to 70. Finally, with each operation consisting of so many simultaneous tasks, these under strength triangular battalions could not normally hold out a reserve/reaction force. Consequently, the company least likely to be decisively engaged was designated the reserve.
Nearly every battalion commander took similar action to fix the problem. On most operations, they formed a composite company from combat support personnel in order to provide more rifle strength and an additional maneuver element. A report at the time stated,
It would be a mistake to view these composite elements in any
other than their true light. They are expedients necessarily
employed by their commanders to alleviate a glaring deficiency in
battalion organization. The men in these organizations are not
trained primarily as riflemen and they lack the leadership,
cohesion, and teamwork which characterize a combat ready rifle
company and platoon. In the truest sense of the word they are
“bastard” units which have been jerry -built to act in a stop gap capacity
An equally or perhaps even more scathing verdict on the triangular battalion was in a study jointly authored by Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell and Major General Ira A. Hunt, Jr: Having been exposed to the full effect of triangular battalions for some months in Vietnam, we will limit ourselves to saying that it is a miserable organization ….
Vietnam Studies: Sharpening the Combat Edge
Interestingly the Australian Task Force in Phouc Tuy Province with its four (rifle) company battalions never seems to have had any of these problems.
It is also interesting to note that at the same time U.S Army Combat Developments Command was conducting a parallel study that independently concluded that the four company battalion was a necessity for all infantry, airmobile, and airborne divisions and separate brigades. In addition to the observations made in Vietnam, this study stated that the three company battalion did not provide an optimum cross-reinforcing capability. Conversely, the four company battalions permitted operations on two or more axes and improved cross-reinforcement by providing a greater number of options.
Permission was soon granted to reorganize battalions with an additional rifle company on a permanent basis. Eventually all US infantry battalions in Vietnam with the exception of mechanized infantry and riverine battalions were reorganized under modified Tables of Organisation & Equipment with a headquarters company, four rifle companies, and a combat support company.
Another more recent example comes from the Falklands Conflict between Britain and Argentina in 1982. The operation in question was the capture of Goose Green by the 2nd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Jones, which had a headquarters company, three rifle companies and a heavy weapons company. Without going into the fine details, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones (who was killed in the assault on Goose Green) planned an attack along two axes. In order to maintain the momentum of the advance along both axes he needed to prevent the Argentines from concentrating against either one of them. In the event that the battalion was blocked along one axis, he could mass the remaining elements on one axis while one acted in an economy of force role tying down enemy forces away from the point of concentration. It was clear that a three company battalion was not equal to such a task, so Lieutenant-Colonel Jones detached the patrol platoon from the headquarters company and the reconnaissance platoon from the heavy weapons company to create a composite company to provide an additional maneuver unit.
The operation succeeded, the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Jones not withstanding. While there are a number of factors which account for 2 Paras’ success, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones’ decision to create a fourth maneuver unit is clearly one of them.
All the aforegoing begs the question, why did the Australian Army decide to adopt a battalion organisation that has been found seriously wanting under some circumstances? To give the benefit of doubt, perhaps this is a case of institutional amnesia. The ‘Vietnam generation’ of officers and NCO’s who would have either observed firsthand or heard anecdotal evidence of the triangular battalion’s shortcomings are long gone; likewise those who commenced their careers after Vietnam but before the Falklands War and would have noted the lessons from that conflict. Apparently their knowledge in this area has not been communicated to the current generation.
In war it is often necessary to improvise, but to make the sort of jerrybuilt makeshifts the US Army employed in Vietnam before an extra rifle company was authorised, default standard practice, is not a good idea.
Forget About The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: What We Need Is The Gripen
On Sunday November 13th 2016 the following episode was broadcast on Background Briefing on ABC Radio National.
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/backgroundbriefing/the-joint-strike-fighter/8018118
Presenter Sarah Dingle opened with the following: “…..have I got a deal for you, Australia.
I’m going to sell you a plane which can do things you can’t even fully describe. In fact, no one can, because it’s just an untested idea on paper. 14 years later, and you still don’t have a plane, but the price tag has more than doubled. And in fact the cost could keep rising. At the end of the day, you’ll pay whatever I ask.
Finally, this unfinished plane overheats on the tarmac. To cool it down, you have to open some of its doors every ten minutes, even when you’re flying. It’s not faster than other planes, and it doesn’t handle well. Chinese hackers could hack your plane out of the sky. And if you weigh less than 75 kilos and you need to eject, its helmet could actually kill you.”
This sets the tone. At the end the only word one can use is ‘damming’.
The F-35 was billed as a fighter jet that could do almost everything the U.S. military desired, serving the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy all in one aircraft design. It’s supposed to replace and improve upon several current – and aging – aircraft types with widely different missions. It’s marketed as a cost-effective, powerful multi-role fighter airplane significantly better than anything potential adversaries could build in the next two decades. But it’s turned out to be none of those things.
Its manufacturer, Lockheed Martin said the plane would be far better than current aircraft – “four times more effective” in air-to-air combat, “eight times more effective” in air-to-ground combat and “three times more effective” in recognizing and suppressing an enemy’s air defenses.
But that’s not how the plane has turned out. In January 2015, mock combat testing pitted the F-35 against an F-16, one of the fighters it is slated to replace. The F-35A was flown “clean” with empty weapon bays and without any drag-inducing and heavy externally mounted weapons or fuel tanks. The F-16D, a heavier and somewhat less capable training version of the mainstay F-16C, was further encumbered with two 370-gallon external wing-mounted fuel tanks. In spite of its significant advantages, the F-35A’s test pilot noted that the F-35A was less maneuverable and markedly inferior to the F-16D in a visual-range dogfight.
US aeronautical engineer Pierre Sprey, a co-designer of the F-16, calls the F-35 an “inherently a terrible airplane.” He has said the F-35 would likely lose a close-in combat encounter to a well-flown MiG-21, a 1950s Soviet fighter design.
Another serious shortcoming is limitations on instrument flight rules—what’s required to take an airplane into bad weather and for night flying. Under international standards for every pilot in civil aviation, his pilot’s license says he can take off and land in perfect weather. Then they have to graduate to instrument conditions. What it comes down to is that the JSF, supposedly the latest and greatest fighter, is restricted from flying in instrument meteorological conditions—something a less than $100,000 Cessna can do.
What’s more costs have blown to several times what was planned. And what has been said so far, only scratches the surface.
So, is there any alternative, any way out of this nightmare? Yes there is; it’s the Saab JAS-39 ‘Gripen’.
The JAS-39 is an excellent low cost fourth-generation fighter, costing only slightly over half of the F-35’s initial cost was going to be. Originally developed in Sweden the 1980s the Nordic machine is designed to be relatively cheap, easy to maintain and fight off any potential aggressor.
Sweden started developing the Gripen in 1979 as a replacement for its J-35 Draken and JA-37 Viggen fighters. The basic requirement was a Mach 2.0-class fighter with good short-field performance. Sweden expected to disperse its aircraft in case of an invasion, (a strategy Australia should consider) which meant that the aircraft had to be able to operate from 2,600ft by 30ft strips. The jets also had be serviceable away from the comforts of a proper airbases since the most likely operating areas were going to be highways and able to be refueled and rearmed if need be, by conscripts with minimal training..
The aircraft that emerged was a single-engine, single-seat, canard design powered by a Volvo-Flygmotor RM12—a license copy derivative of the F/A-18’s General Electric F404-GE-400. Sweden did not develop the Gripen entirely on its own, a lot of the technologies like the engine, were outsourced to keep costs down.
Over the years, there have been two previous iterations of the Gripen. The original A and B models gave way to the much-improved C and D model aircraft. The latest version the Gripen E has a longer range than earlier versions the shorter range of which, was a potential stumbling block for consideration for adoption by Australia.
The final piece of good news is, that under Sweden’s restrictive arms export policy Australia comfortably passes muster. Sweden has a longstanding policy of not selling arms to unstable parts of the world nor to countries with really atrocious human rights records. The likes of the late lamented Saddam Hussein needn’t apply, likewise any application by say for example Myanmar, would also be swiftly knocked back.
The only issue remaining is whether to purchase Gripens directly or license manufacture them here and as I don’t feel well enough informed enough to pass comment on this I’ll stop here.
What Would an Invasion of Australia Look Like?
Before I try and answer this question, first I will go into what it would not look like. Would you would not see would be a Normandy D-Day style large scale onslaught, with warships, aircraft, troopships and landing craft; the works. To start off with Australia would have ample advance warning; it would be impossible to keep the preparations for an operation of this size secret or covert, try as one might.
Second, when the invasion came close it would probably be detected hours if not days before it reached Australia, and intercepted by the RAAF and Navy and any of the invasion force that did land would swiftly dealt with by the (by now substantially reinforced) Army. This could all be done without US help if need be
What an invasion would look like is this.
At least six months ahead of the invasion Australia would be seeded with sleeper cells of terrorists, provocateurs and saboteurs, to precede a conventional invading force. If this sounds implausible it would be well to point out that of the four man jihadi cell which carried out the 7/7 attacks in London in 2005 one only one had come to the attention of MI5 who determined after brief scrutiny that he was not a likely threat and accordingly he was not put under surveillance. Of the remaining three none had come to the attention of the security services or law enforcement in any way, they didn’t have so much as a speeding ticket between them. The point being made here is that with over 100 000 border crossings a day it would be very difficult to detect anyone entering Australia with ‘malice aforethought’ so to speak.
Once the sleeper cells were in place they would be activated on a given signal. While they were wreaking havoc, hidden aboard a string of innocent-looking cargo ships in the traffic-jammed sea lanes to the northwest of Australia would be specially trained and equipped troops. Also there could be airborne assaults as well, using aircraft disguised as commercial airliners as depicted in the movie Red Dawn (1984). Along the more remote areas of the coast forward reconnaissance ‘pathfinder’ teams could be inserted by disguised surface vessels or submarine, ahead of the ‘spearhead’ force. With the ADF and law enforcement taken by surprise and caught off guard and generally distracted by the internal attacks, the seaborne and airborne spearhead forces would have a good chance of establishing a bridgehead or bridgeheads and then the main invasion force would start pouring in.
The overall chance of an invasion is not that high, but it is higher than most people realize. I am in no way suggesting that the scenario I have set out above is what will happen, but it is by far the most likely one.
A Concerned Patriot 